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Abstract: 
This article explains how debt markets have malfunctioned in the crisis, with deleterious 
consequences for the real economy. I begin with a quick overview of debt markets. I then 
discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions: risk capital and risk aversion, 
repo financing and haircuts, and counterparty risk. In each of these areas, feedback effects can 
arise, so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious 
spiral. I document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during 
the crisis. Next, I show how these issues caused debt markets to break down: fundamental 
values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far 
removed from the “toxic” subprime mortgage assets at the root of the crisis. Finally, I discuss 
briefly four steps that the Federal Reserve took to ease the crisis, and how each was geared to a 
specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
*Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Email: a-krishnamurthy@kellogg.northwestern.edu.  I am grateful to Tobias Adrian, Markus 
Brunnermeier, Ricardo Caballero, Jan Eberly, Mike Fishman, Gary Gorton, Bengt Holmstrom, Ravi 
Jagannathan, Jonathan Parker, Todd Pulvino, and Asani Sarkar for their comments.  I also thank the 
editors of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Timothy Taylor, David Autor and Chad Jones, for their 
comments. This article was prepared for the Winter 2010 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
  
 
2 
 
 
  The financial crisis that began in 2007 is especially a crisis in debt markets. For example, 
the stock market peaked in October 2007, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average near 14,000, 
and was still near 12,000 in August 2008.  While the Dow Jones eventually fell to 6600 by March 
2009, most of that fall happened in late 2008. However, problems in debt markets like the 
mortgage-backed securities market had been in full swing since August of 2007.  A full 
understanding of what happened in the financial crisis requires inquiring into the plumbing of 
debt markets.  
Trades in debt markets are predominantly made by financial institutions – like banks, 
hedge funds, and insurance companies– rather than households. One key feature of markets in 
debt instruments is that whenever a trader wishes to make an investment, it must first raise 
money, either through a sale of existing financial assets, or by borrowing funds from another 
party.   If funds can be raised fairly easily and quickly, debt markets should function fairly 
smoothly. But during a financial crisis, funds often cannot be raised easily or quickly. In such a 
setting, the fundamental values for certain assets can become separated from a time from 
market prices, with consequences that can echo into the real economy.  
  This article will explain in concrete ways how debt markets can malfunction, with 
deleterious consequences for the real economy. I begin with a quick overview of debt markets. 
I then discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions: risk capital and risk 
aversion, repo financing and haircuts, and counterparty risk. In each of these areas, feedback 
effects can arise, so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a 
contagious spiral. I'll document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on 
liquidity during the crisis. Next, I'll show how these issues caused debt markets to break down: 
indeed, fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and 
products that were far removed from the “toxic” subprime mortgage assets at the root of the 
crisis. Finally, I'll discuss briefly four steps that the Federal Reserve took to ease the crisis, and 
how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis.  
It is important to keep in mind throughout this discussion that a “financial institution” is 
not just a traditional commercial bank.  A number of different intermediaries do not take 
deposits directly from households, but in many ways functionally behave like banks in debt 
markets, even though they are not labeled banks.  I use the term “financial institution” to refer 
to all of these entities, including insurance companies, hedge funds, brokers and dealers, and 
government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
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DEBT MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
Debt instruments can be usefully divided into loans and securities.  The key distinction is that a 
“loan” is an investment that a financial institution has made and intends to hold to maturity. 
However, a security is an asset that is backed by a pool of loans originated by some financial 
institution, but which has subsequently been sold by the financial institution and is being held 
by another entity. A mortgage-backed security, where the backing is a pool of residential loans, 
is the typical security.  
 
Table 1 provides a sense of the type and size of the debt markets that have been at the center 
of the financial crisis.  The categories under “loans” are familiar ones: three categories of 
mortgage loans differentiated by the riskiness of the borrower (from more to less riskiness, 
subprime, Alt-A and prime), along with commercial real estate and corporate loans. Under the 
listing of securities, all instruments with the exception of corporate bonds are “structured 
finance” instruments in which a pool of underlying loans backs possibly multiple tranches of 
securities, distinguished by seniority. Typically, investors in junior tranches would take all the 
losses before those in higher mezzanine or even higher senior tranches would take any losses.  
The most complex of these structured investments are the collateralized debt obligations 
where the assets backing the securitization are themselves the junior or mezzanine tranches of 
other securitizations.  Under the category of asset-backed securities, the underlying loans are 
non-mortgage lending, like car loans or credit card loans. Collateralized loan obligations are 
backed by corporate loans.  Mortgage-backed securities are backed by either residential or 
commercial real estate loans. The total in Table 1 across both loans and securities is $18.64 
trillion.   
 
The debt instruments in Table 1 are held by a number of financial institutions.  Table 2 provides 
a sense of the main financial institutions in the United States, and the size of these institutions 
as measured by total assets.  It is difficult to trace which financial institutions hold which 
instrument.  They are distributed among commercial banks, investment banks (including 
brokers and dealers), hedge funds, insurance companies, some mutual funds, and the 
government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. For the most part, loans 
are held by commercial banks, with securities distributed across the different institutions.   
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Moreover, insurance companies and government-sponsored enterprises hold less risky 
securities, while brokers and dealers, hedge funds, and commercial banks hold riskier securities.     
 
 
Three Considerations in Every Debt Market Purchase  
 
 
Every time a trader makes a purchase in a debt market, three considerations must enter the 
picture: risk capital, the haircuts in the repo market, and counterparty risk. This section explains 
each of these factors, and then discusses the role that each played during the financial crisis.   
  
Risk Capital and Institutional Risk Aversion 
 
A financial institution can raise capital in two ways: equity or debt. “Risk capital” refers to the 
equity capital.  Consider the hypothetical balance sheet of a financial institution: 
Assets                   Liabilities 
Treasury securities and cash = 50 
 
Risky loans and debt instruments = 50 
(like mortgage-backed securities) 
 
Debt = 90 
 
Equity = 10 
 
This financial institution raises $100 by issuing $10 of equity and $90 of debt.  It holds $50 in 
liquid low risk securities such as Treasuries and $50 in risky mortgage-backed securities. 
Now suppose that the trader/management of the financial institution is considering selling 
some Treasuries and buying a higher return mortgage-backed security.  Moreover, suppose that 
there are potentially large costs of financial distress (like risks of bankruptcy and job loss) that 
the trader/management accounts for in making investment decisions.  Then, the portfolio 
choice decision will balance the higher returns on the mortgage-backed security against the 
increased probability of financial distress.  A higher proportion of debt tends—or conversely, a  
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lower level of risk capital—makes a financial institution more risk-averse in its portfolio 
choices.
1   
  
In practice, this tradeoff of less risk capital leading to greater institutional risk aversion can 
manifest itself in different ways. For commercial banks, this tradeoff is embodied in regulatory 
capital requirements.  Banks must have equity capital commensurate to the risk of their asset 
portfolio to keep the probability of financial distress sufficiently small. For other financial 
institutions, decision making at the level of a trader is often formulated in terms of a value-at-
risk constraint, which essentially imposes a constraint on a trader’s portfolio choice such that 
the probability of a large loss must fall below a given threshold.   A firm with less risk capital, 
and hence a higher probability of financial distress, will impose tighter value-at-risk constraints 
on its traders. The tighter constraint induces risk aversion into the portfolio decisions of the 
trader.
2 The risk of financial distress is a consideration for all financial institutions that 
participate in debt markets.  In this sense, risk capital considerations are broader than 
regulatory capital considerations. 
 
Suppose that on our hypothetical balance sheet, the loans on the asset side fall in value to $45. 
This financial institution then has remaining equity capital of $5, and is closer to financial 
distress.  Alternatively, suppose that the financial institution is a hedge fund, whose investors 
have a right to withdraw their equity and choose to withdraw $5. Again, the financial institution 
will have only $5 of equity capital left. 
 
In both of these cases, when risk capital is reduced, unless the lost risk capital is immediately 
replaced by issuing $5 of equity, the financial institution’s reduced risk capital may affect its 
trading decisions.  It may be less willing to purchase more mortgage-backed securities.  If 
another investor is selling mortgage-backed securities, the financial institution will bid a lower 
price to purchase these securities. 
                                                           
1 The corporate finance literature identifies another effect of low levels of capital on risk taking.  When the 
decision maker (i.e. manager/trader) has little stake in the long-run survival of the financial institution, his short-
run interest will be to take excessive risks.  This factor will cause financial institutions to seek out the riskiest 
investments.  Empirically, during this and other crises, financial institutions seem to behave in a risk-averse fashion 
rather than in a risk-seeking fashion.    
2 A growing empirical literature documents how the limited risk capital of financial institutions affects asset prices: 
for some recent examples, see Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007), Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman 
(2007), and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008). Each focuses on a different asset market. To model the effect of risk 
capital on asset prices, one needs a theory of why risk capital is limited and why households (the ultimate 
investors) may not provide equity capital to finance all high return investments.  See He and Krishnamurthy 
(2009a) for a model based on agency considerations.   
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If a single financial institution loses risk capital, it may not affect equilibrium in debt markets. 
The affected financial institution may be more reluctant to acquire more assets, but others will 
readily buy these assets and asset prices will not be affected. On the other hand, suppose that 
the losses are across all financial institutions – that is the event is systemic as was the case after 
2007. In the situation when aggregate risk capital is affected, it will have an effect on asset 
prices.   
 
During the crisis, financial institutions have taken enormous losses in their risk capital. Table 3 
reports an estimate of losses on traded securities and writedowns on loans by the main U.S. 
financial institutions that hold debt instruments, reported for some of the main classes of debt 
securities by the IMF in its October 2008 Global Financial Stability Report. The total across these 
assets classes for banks, insurers and hedge funds is $985 billion.  The losses and writedowns 
are split across real estate related debt instruments (loans, mortgage-backed securities, some 
asset-based securities and collateralized debt obligations) and corporate and consumer loans 
(asset-based securities and collateralized debt obligations, corporate debt and collateralized 
loan obligations).  The writedowns are as reported by the financial institutions, and may be an 
underestimate of losses.  The fundamental sources of the losses are falling real estate prices, 
along with declines in corporate profitability and household income. 
 
The decline in risk capital can be greater than the losses shown here. For example, the hedge 
fund and other category has losses on these assets totaling $135 billion.  Hedge fund risk capital 
has in fact fallen more than this amount because of investor redemptions.  Up until early 2009, 
these redemptions are estimated to be around $277 billion (Lipper TASS Hedge Fund Asset 
Flows Report). 
 
The cumulative reported losses across banks, insurers, and government sponsored enterprises 
from the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009 is $971 billion; total capital 
raised is $732 billion, with a good part of this due to the U.S. Treasury capital injection plan 
(TARP), according to an estimate by Bloomberg.  This estimate covers a larger set of financial 
institutions than that of Table 3, but excludes hedge funds. As noted above, the losses are as 
reported by the banks, and are plausibly an underestimate of actual losses. The difference 
between losses and capital raised of around $239 billion is the current shortfall to the financial 
sector.    
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The widespread loss in risk capital seems fully sufficient to reduce liquidity in debt markets in a 
way that, as a minimum, puts downward pressure on prices.  A perverse feedback effect arises 
here that has played a part in the financial crisis.  Risk capital falls, causing institutional risk 
aversion to rise and asset values to fall, causing risk capital to fall further, and so on.
3 
 
Repo Financing and Haircuts 
In practice, financial institutions raise equity capital infrequently.  For most financial institutions 
that actively trade in debt markets on a day-to-day basis, cash needs are met by borrowing 
through repurchase agreements. A description of the repurchase agreement—commonly 
referred to as a “repo”— should help to clarify why. 
A repo agreement is a loan that is collateralized by financial securities. Suppose that a hedge 
fund wished to purchase a mortgage-backed security for $100.  Consider two options: 1) raise 
$100 from hedge fund investors in the form of equity capital (or use some of the equity capital 
previously given by investors); or 2) use the $100 worth of mortgage-backed security as 
collateral to take out a loan.  If the trader chooses the latter strategy, a lender will forward 
$100 minus a haircut to the hedge fund.  Haircuts for prime mortgage-backed securities, before 
the crisis in early 2007, were 2.5 percent of value, so that the hedge fund would have been able 
to borrow $97.50 in this way.  Lenders typically set the haircut high enough so that they need 
not do any detailed analysis of the underlying collateral.  For the hedge fund, a repo loan is 
easily arranged –it just takes a phone call.  Hordahl and King (2008) of the Bank of International 
Settlements estimate that the repo market in 2007 was roughly $10 trillion in size.  
 
Risk capital remains important here. The repo lender provides $97.50, but the hedge fund 
needs $2.50 from its equity investors to have the $100 needed to purchase the security.   In 
practice, the $2.50 will not come from a new sale of equity, but rather from a past sale of 
equity to investors or from reinvesting past returns on equity.  Finally, while I am using a hedge 
fund as my example, it should be clear that my description applies to any financial institution—
for example, the trading desk at a bank—that is actively trading a debt instrument.
4 
                                                           
3 See He and Krishnamurthy (2009b) for a model of this risk capital effect and a quantitative evaluation of 
government policies to remedy the risk capital feedback effect.   
4 An important question lurks here which I am only touching on: Why don’t financial institutions only raise equity 
capital? What is the role of repo financing?  The issue is not settled.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1998) suggest that savers/households have a demand to hold their savings in a liquid asset and that 
financial institutions satisfy this demand through the structure of their liabilities.  Krishnamurthy and Vissing- 
 
8 
The magnitude of the required haircut will affect purchases in the debt market. Suppose that 
the hedge fund had $2.50 of equity capital, but the mortgage-backed security haircut doubled 
to 5 percent.
5  Then, the maximum size of balance sheet for the hedge fund would be $50 of 
mortgage-backed security financed by $47.50 in repo debt. 
 
The repo market lies at the heart of all debt markets.  On the demand side of this market, if the 
trading desk of a financial institution had to go to its equity holders every time it needed the 
cash to purchase a debt security, there would be almost no secondary market trading in debt 
securities.  The speed of transaction in the repo market plays an important role in supporting 
the trading and liquidity of debt markets.  As shown in Figure 1, a collection of Wall Street 
banks (for example, Goldman, Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase) are at the center of the 
repo market.  On the repo lending side, the typical cash investor in a repo is a money market 
fund that is looking for a relatively safe place to invest a large amount of cash over a short 
period. During less turbulent times, debt instruments are low volatility assets.  To the cash 
investor, repo is attractive—say, relative to placing money in a large time deposit in a bank—
because it is over-collateralized. The haircut of 2.5 percent on mortgage-backed security in a 
normal market provides sufficient protection against losses that lenders are comfortable with 
repo.   
 
When repo lenders determine haircuts, they have two main considerations: 1) the probability 
of a borrower defaulting on the repo loan; and 2) the recovery value when liquidating the 
collateral in the secondary market, if default occurs.  The first of these considerations is 
reasonably clear, and for these short-term loans it is usually quite small. The second 
consideration has played a dramatic role in the crisis.  The secondary market for mortgage-
backed securities is less liquid than the secondary market for Treasuries.  As a result, a lender 
will be more concerned when lending against mortgage-backed security collateral than 
Treasury collateral.  Prior to the crisis, mortgage-backed security haircuts were around 2.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jorgenson (2008) offer empirical evidence that this demand is quantitatively large and has significant effects on 
asset prices. Repos can meet this need because they are typically short-maturity (hence, de-factor liquid), quick to 
transact, and there is a large pool of financial securities that can serve as collateral to back repo. For a discussion of 
the repo market and securitization from this point of view, see Holmstrom (2008) and Gorton (2009). Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2009) argue that the demand for safe/liquid securities over the last decade, driven by global 
imbalances, helps to explain the increase in financial sector leverage prior to the current crisis. 
5 In practice, if the hedge fund has a position of $100 of securities that it is financing in the repo market with the 
haircut of 2.5 percent, and the haircut suddenly increases to 5 percent, the hedge fund will be asked to either put 
up another $2.50 of equity capital, or halve the size of its security position.  
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percent while Treasury haircuts were 2 percent, as shown in Table 4.   During the crisis, liquidity 
considerations have been magnified, with dramatic effects on repo haircuts.
6   
Table 4 provides a sense of how repo haircuts have evolved over the crisis for a number of debt 
instruments.  For each time period and debt instrument, I am reporting a typical haircut faced 
by a financial institution.  In practice, haircuts vary across borrowers at every given point in 
time; for example, a hedge fund typically will face higher haircuts than a large Wall Street bond 
dealer.  The data in the first three columns is from the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (provided by Tobias Adrian of the New York Fed), with the column for fall of 2008 
filled out from reports of investment banks. 
  
Haircuts on all classes of securities rise during a financial crisis. 
7 This occurs is in part because 
the average borrower is less creditworthy, so that a lender must account for a higher 
probability of default. (This point is discussed further in the next section on counterparty risk.)  
The haircuts rise the least for the most liquid securities.  For example, short-term U.S. 
Treasuries have remained very liquid through the crisis, and also have seen no change in 
haircuts.  On the other hand, the more exotic asset-backed securities with the least liquid 
secondary markets have the highest haircuts in the fall of 2008.  Gorton and Metrick (2009) 
provide further information on the evolution of haircuts on some of the more exotic debt-
market instruments, and note that for some of the lower-rated tranches of securitizations, the 
repo haircuts in the fall of 2008 went to 100 percent, indicating that the repo market essentially 
closed.  
 
As one might expect, rising haircuts during the financial crisis were accompanied by a shrinkage 
of the repo market.  We can get a sense of this shrinkage using data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. They report repo activity by bond dealers where the underlying collaterals 
are U.S. Treasury securities, mortgage-backed securities insured by government-sponsored 
Agencies, as well as government-sponsored Agency debt.  This data do not include any of the 
lower quality asset-backed securities that have been most severely affected in the crisis.
8  In 
January 2007, the repo activity was about $350 billion, measured as a monthly rolling average. 
By April 2008 it had risen to $450 billion. But then it fell sharply in the rest of 2008, dropping to 
                                                           
6 For further details on the repo market, see Adrian and Shin (2008) and Gorton and Metrick (2009). For a paper 
modeling the determination of repo haircuts and effects on asset prices see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007).  
7 In practice, there are two dimensions of adjustment on the repo contract: the haircut and the interest rate on the 
repo loan, the repo rate. Repo rates, on the less liquid securities, also rise as the crisis worsens.     
8 Note that these repo volumes, in the hundreds of billions, are smaller than $10 trillion as reported by the Bank of 
International Settlements.  The difference is because the BIS numbers cover a greater number of securities that 
serve as collateral as well as a larger number of financial institutions (including foreign banks).   
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$250 billion by January 2009, and staying at that lower level through May 2009. Many 
observers have referred to the decline in the repo market in the second half of 2008 as 
“deleveraging”—that is, borrowers take on a lower level of repo market loans.   
As noted earlier, the liquidity of debt markets is facilitated by trading desks and hedge funds. As 
repo haircuts rise, these players’ activities are curtailed.  A perverse feedback effect arises here 
that has played a part in the financial crisis.  Liquidity falls, causing repo haircuts to rise, causing 
liquidity to fall further, and so on.
9 
 
Counterparty Risk 
The typical debt-market transaction involves a counterparty – some other financial institution 
that is part of the transaction. Thus, risk in a debt market investment is not limited to the 
interest and capital gains from the asset that is purchased, but also lies in whether the 
counterparty makes good on its obligations.   
 
Consider the case of the hedge fund borrowing in the repo market.  In practice, the lender to 
the hedge fund will be an investment or commercial bank.  Suppose that the investment bank 
declares bankruptcy immediately after the repo transaction is initiated. In this case, the hedge 
fund will have $97.50 of the bank’s cash, but the bank will have the hedge fund’s collateral -- 
$100 worth of the hedge fund’s securities.
10  The hedge fund may pursue its claim on the bank 
of $2.50 (or the replacement value of the securities) in bankruptcy proceedings.  But this 
process is a slow one, possibly occurring over a year or so. In this case, the fast repo transaction 
now becomes a slow transaction.  We say in this case that the hedge fund bears counterparty 
risk in arranging the repo with the bank.  Somewhat counterintuitively, a hedge fund must be 
careful in selecting its lenders! As counterparty risk grows, financial institutions reduce their 
reliance on repo, but then have to shift to slower financing arrangements. Inevitably, the 
trading decisions of financial institutions are affected, and with that, the prices and liquidity of 
the traded debt instruments suffers. 
 
                                                           
9 Some papers have modeled closely related feedback mechanisms.  Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) present a 
model in which a rise in the volatility of an asset feeds back into a higher haircut, and a further rise in volatility 
(“haircut/margin spiral”).  Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) present a model of the feedback between risk capital and 
secondary market liquidity.   
10 This example of counterparty risk is based on a “bilateral” repo agreement which is the typical agreement 
between a hedge fund and a bank.  Repos are also structured as “trilateral” agreements where a particularly 
strong bank stands between all parties and holds the collateral.  The trilateral repo is thus less subject to 
counterparty risk.  
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Counterparty risk arises in any bilateral transaction.  Another common example of a transaction 
with counterparty risk is the interest rate swap. A “LIBOR interest rate swap” is an agreement 
between two parties—say, bank A and bank B— where both have obligations to make 
payments to the other.  The payments depend on what happens to interest rates, or more 
specifically, what happens to the London Interbank Overnight Rate, which is an index that 
serves as a benchmark borrowing cost for large banks.  The index is published daily by the 
British Banker’s Association, based on a survey of several large banks.   
A 10-year $100 million interest rate swap agreed to between bank A and bank B will have bank 
A responsible for paying interest to bank B, calculated based on LIBOR, as quoted on a series of 
pre-specified dates,  applied to $100 million of principal.  The dates might be specified as every 
six months over the next ten years.  Bank B in turn is obligated to pay, on the same 20 payment 
dates, a fixed rate that is agreed to when the deal is initiated.  This fixed rate is referred to as 
the “swap rate.”  Clearly, the swap rate at initiation will be based on expected LIBOR over the 
next 10 years.   
This transaction clearly involves counterparty risk.  Bank A will be worried about entering into 
such a transaction with Bank B, if Bank B’s credit quality deteriorates (and vice-versa).  In this 
case, Bank A may ask for extra collateral from Bank B, or may choose to terminate (or not 
initiate) the interest rate swap.  Increasing counterparty risk triggers demands for greater 
collateral and reduces the volume of transactions in interest rate swaps. 
 
A credit default swap is a financial instrument to address counterparty risk. In this case, for 
example, Bank A might purchase a credit default swap, making an up-front payment and then 
being protected against Bank B being unable to make the scheduled payments. In this way, the 
price of credit default swaps is a measure of counterparty risk.  Figure 3 graphs the five-year 
credit default swap rates for four major financial institutions over the period from March 1, 
2008 to November 10, 2008.  The “credit default swap rate” measures the dollar cost that must 
be paid as an annual insurance premium to insure against default on a notional $10,000 face-
value of bonds.  The roughly $1,000 premium for Morgan Stanley in October 2008, reflects a 
very high default probability, implying a (risk-neutral) probability of Morgan Stanley going 
bankrupt over the next five years of roughly 60 percent.
11   
 
                                                           
11 To understand where the 60 percent probability comes from, consider the following computation. Suppose the 
recovery rate in default is 50 cents on the dollar for Morgan Stanley and it costs $1,000 per year to purchase 
insurance on $10,000, then the annual default probability is 20 percent.  Then over five years the probability that 
Morgan Stanley will default is approximately 60 percent, following basic probability rules.  
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Figure 3 indicates three events in which the bankruptcy issues come to the forefront. First, the 
failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008 raised concerns that other investment banks would also 
fail. Thus, the credit default swap rates for Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs rise in this 
event, while the parallel rates for Citigroup and Bank of America, which are commercial banks, 
do not increase as much.  Second, credit default swap rates increase by an order of magnitude 
following Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008 and AIG’s near-bankruptcy. The AIG 
event is particular important in this period.  AIG went from being a high quality AA-rated insurer 
to near-bankruptcy in one week.  The speed of this decline suggested to many market 
participants that other financial firms could decline as quickly.  In addition, AIG was the 
counterparty on a large volume of swaps with other financial institutions.  Market participants 
grew concerned that the failure of AIG would lead to default on many of these swap 
obligations, leading to large losses at other financial institutions. Third, credit default swap  
rates come down somewhat in October 2008. The U.S. Treasury purchased equity capital in 
financial institutions in October, thus reducing the probability of bankruptcy. In addition, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks.   
 
LIQUIDITY 
 
I have thus far discussed how falling risk capital, rising repo haircuts, and increased 
counterparty risk can impinge on the actions of financial institutions. More specifically, I’ve 
argued that these factors reduce liquidity in debt markets. Declining liquidity reflects two 
considerations.  Financial institutions that provide the secondary market in debt instruments 
reduce their purchasing for these reasons. In addition, during a financial crisis many investors 
become more averse to owning illiquid investments, preferring to keep their investments in 
liquid assets.
12 
13 
 
 
                                                           
12 Investors’ aversion to illiquidity and demand for liquid assets is present in most crises. Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) present a model showing how a rise in Knightian uncertainty can trigger this behavior.  They 
argue that Knightian uncertainty has played an important role in this and past crises.  Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) 
and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) show how the anticipation of binding financial constraints can trigger the demand 
for liquid assets.  Vayanos (2004) shows how a hedge fund manager, who fears redemptions by equity investors, 
will demand more liquid assets. 
13 Other liquidity problems have also been present in debt markets.  For example, Fishman and Parker (2009) show 
how adverse selection problems in loan markets can lead to a fall in prices and reduced lending/trading.  I do not 
touch on adverse selection issues in this paper, although they have surely played a role in the crisis.  
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Claims of reduced liquidity can sometimes be difficult to document, but in this section, I offer 
specific evidence of liquidity problems in debt markets.  Specifically, I compare pairs of assets 
where one asset is more liquid than the other, but which are otherwise similar. I show that the 
price of the illiquid asset has fallen in the crisis relative to the price of the liquid asset. In 
addition, I will emphasize the connection between liquidity and maturity: that is, a shorter-term 
security is more liquid, so a desire for greater liquidity will tend to favor shorter-term securities 
over longer-term ones.  
 
As my first example, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) issues bonds to finance 
its activities. These bonds resemble U.S. Treasury bonds in many ways, except that they do not 
carry the explicit guarantee of the U.S. Government and the secondary market for FNMA bonds 
is less liquid than that of Treasury bonds. 
 
The solid line in Figure 4 graphs the spread between five-year FNMA bonds and five-year 
Treasury bonds from January 2007 to December 2007.  In January 2007, the spread is near 20 
basis points, which in part is a compensation for the explicit guarantee of Treasury bonds and 
the superior liquidity of Treasury bonds.  By mid-2008, the spread rises to 80 basis points.  The 
U.S. Government placed FNMA in a conservatorship on September 7, 2008, and guaranteed 
that it would ensure that the book value of capital remained positive.  For all intents and 
purposes, this announcement was a guarantee of debt, although it left open the possibility that 
the government would re-privativize FNMA and remove the debt guarantee in the future. The 
spread to Treasuries fell to 58 basis points on September 12, 2008. In the turmoil of the fall of 
2008, the spread reversed direction and increased again, reaching its highest levels of near 140 
basis points.   To provide some perspective on these spreads, the average FNMA to Treasury 
spread from 1958 to 2004 was 38 basis points, and the annual standard deviation of the spread 
was 22 basis points.   
I interpret this event as reflecting a dramatic flight to liquidity by investors. That is, investors 
increased their valuation of the liquid Treasury relative to the less liquid FNMA bonds, causing 
the spread to rise.
14 
                                                           
14  The other plausible interpretation of the increase in the spread is that the market grew to doubt the 
government’s support of FNMA. This hypothesis however is hard to reconcile with a second fact: the spread 
between two-year FNMA bonds and two-year Treasury bonds (dashed line) increased to 170 basis points in the 
same period.  That is, the odds of the government removing its positive-capital guarantee should be higher over 
the next five years than over the next two years.  On the other hand, the demand for liquidity should be expected 
to lessen over time as the crisis passes. Hence the demand for liquidity effect should have a greater impact on the  
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My second example of the flight to liquidity during the financial crisis compares interest rates 
on Treasury bills to the federal funds overnight index swap rate. Figure 5 graphs the yields on 
three-month Treasury bills and the three-month overnight index swap rate.  The “overnight 
index swap rate” is a market measure of the expected overnight federal funds rate, in this case, 
for the next three months.
15  By comparing three-month Treasury bills to the three-month 
index swap rate, rather than the overnight federal funds rate, we can be sure that there are no 
anticipated changes in the federal funds rate that affect the comparison.  For reference, I have 
also graphed the overnight Federal Funds target rate in dashed line on the figure. 
Notice the movement in the Treasury bill yield in March 2008 at the time of the Bear Stearns 
failure, and again in the turmoil of fall 2008. The Treasury bill yield in particular falls during 
these events. The overnight index swap rate does not change appreciably, indicating that the 
Federal Reserve’s policy rate is stable through these market gyrations.  The movements are also 
large: the Treasury bill yield falls over 1 percent relative to the overnight index swap. The 
Treasury bill is the perhaps the most liquid instrument in the debt markets.  These events also 
illustrate how investors increase their valuation of the most liquid Treasury securities relative to 
other securities. 
 
Once you start looking, examples of decreased liquidity in the debt markets in late 2008 are 
apparent in many comparisons like these. For example, one can look at the yield spread 
between the most recently issued 30-year Treasury bond and the 30-year bond that was issued 
two auctions prior. The most recently issued bond is known as the on-the-run bond, and bonds 
issued in prior auctions are off-the-run bond.  The on-the-run bond is more liquid than the off-
the-run bond (Krishnamurthy, 2001). Not surprisingly, the interest rate spreads between these 
two types of bonds rise in the fall 2008 turmoil and remain high through March 2009, before 
falling back to near zero recently—a pattern similar to the others I have presented. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
two-year bond than the five-year bond.  Indeed, one would expect that the increased demand for liquidity in a 
crisis is most evident in the behavior of short-maturity bonds, which is what I show in Figure 5. 
 
15 Formally, the overnight index swap rate is the fixed rate on a three-month interest rate swap, whose floating leg 
is based on the average overnight federal funds rate over the next three months. Following on the previous 
discussion of interest rate swaps and counterparty risk, one may ask whether the three-month overnight index 
swap rate is distorted by counterparty risk concerns.  This is possible, but does not seem to be the case because 
the three-month overnight index swap rate tracks movements in the overnight federal funds rate fairly closely.    
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Liquidity and the maturity of debt instruments are closely related: for example, a three-month 
loan is less liquid than an overnight loan.  As investors demand for liquidity rises, they will 
therefore be less willing to supply 3-month loans relative to overnight loans.  This phenomenon 
has had important effects on many key short-term bond markets. 
 
My third main example of a shift in liquidity focuses on this maturity relationship. Figure 6 
compares the ratio of overnight repo financing obtained by primary dealers—like the major 
Wall Street investment banks as they existed in 2007—relative to the costlier longer-term repo 
financing (defined as total financing minus overnight financing for an average time of one 
month).  The repo activity is for Treasury, mortgage, and government-sponsored agency bonds 
only and thus does not include some of the lower quality asset-backed securities that have 
been most severely affected in the crisis. I present a rolling monthly average of this ratio to 
smooth out some of the high frequency fluctuations.  The data is from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York.  The data reveal a gradual shift towards overnight financing. In the summer 
of 2007 period, the ratio is a little above 1.5. By early 2008, the ratio approaches 2. In the fall of 
2008 turmoil, the ratio reaches a peak of around 3.5 before declining in early 2009. 
 
For institutions actively trading in bond markets, relying on overnight financing is inherently 
more risky than relying on longer-term financing.
16  For example, suppose a trader wishes to 
bet that Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) bonds are underpriced.  To do so, the 
trader buys the FNMA bonds (using some risk capital) and borrows using the FNMA collateral in 
the repo market.  If the trader thought that the underpricing would resolve over the next three 
months, then ideally, the trader would also repo finance out to three months.  If, alternatively, 
the trader tried a strategy of rolling over overnight repo for three months, the trader faces the 
risk of being unable to renew the financing in the interim and thus being forced to exit the 
position prematurely.  Thus, a decrease in the maturity of repo financing means an increase in 
its riskiness—which will make this trade less likely to attempt to exploit perceived arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 
The maturity contraction I have discussed in the context of the repo market appears to have 
taken place across many different financing arenas: that is, a greater preference for liquidity 
has led to a shortening of debt maturity in many markets, with attendant effects on activity.  
                                                           
16 He and Xiong (2009) model how an increased reliance on short-term financing can lead to a coordination failure 
whereby some lenders choose not to renew their financing, anticipating that other lenders will also not renew 
financing, precipitating bankruptcy of the borrower.   
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Many observers note the same phenomena in the interbank market for federal funds loans; 
indeed, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2008) commented on the “illiquidity” 
problem in the interbank market.  Throughout this crisis, the interest rate on interbank loans 
for a three month maturity far exceeded the overnight federal funds rate.   Monetary policy 
only directly controls the overnight rate. In a normal liquid market, market expectations and 
arbitrage forces transmit policy changes in the overnight rate to longer term rates, such as the 
three month interest rate, thereby affecting the relevant cost of borrowing for firms and 
households.  However, in the illiquid environment of the crisis this transmission has been 
impaired, reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy.   Unfortunately, it is hard to obtain 
data analogous to Figure 6 for the interbank market to clearly document these effects.   
My final main example of liquidity issues focuses on one market where these liquidity/maturity 
effects are straightforward to perceive: the commercial paper market. The commercial paper 
market is an important source of quick funds for high‐grade firms in the corporate and financial 
sectors. If a company like General Electric (GE) needs to raise $100 million quickly, it can do so 
in the commercial paper market. However, the commercial paper market is also used as an 
ongoing source of funds, by borrowing anew in this market (“rolling over loans”) as prior 
obligations become due. In June 2008, GE had $63 billion in commercial paper outstanding. This 
was one‐third of GE’s short‐term borrowings and over 10 percent of its total borrowing. The 
predominant buyers of commercial paper are money market mutual funds. 
The solid line in Figure 7 indicates the total volume of short-term financing that is issued on any 
given day in the key period of summer and early fall 2008.  The data is for loans from 1-9 days, 
but much of the financing is probably overnight.  The dashed lines correspond to longer term 
financing.  What looks like a relatively small decline in issuance of longer-term financing 
(dashed lines) generates a larger rise in the issuance of short-term financing, because it means 
that more firms must return to the market day after day to borrow. When companies are 
forced into the commercial paper market on a daily or weekly basis, instead of every month or 
two, they rightfully perceive that they face an increased risk of being unable to finance 
themselves. At least some firms will respond to the shortening of maturities by cutting back on 
expenditures immediately—which is one of the ways that the effects of a credit contraction can 
be exacerbated.  
 
Price Effects on Debt Securities 
 
I have described how the perennial issues of risk capital, repo financing and haircuts and 
counterparty risk can reduce liquidity in debt markets.  The mechanisms I have described also 
suggest a vicious cycle: a decline in asset values reduces risk capital, raises haircuts, and 
increases counterparty risk. In turn, purchasers in debt markets will be less eager to buy. There  
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is a flight to more liquid and shorter maturity debt instruments. In some cases, disfavored debt 
markets can essentially cease to exist for a time—as when haircuts for certain debt instruments 
reach 100 percent. But even before that outcome, the lack of liquidity and purchasers in debt 
markets can mean that arbitrage fails to perform well, and fundamental prices can diverge from 
market prices. 
17  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) dub these kinds of market problems as a “limit to 
arbitrage.”   
 
Here, I present two examples to illustrate how these limits of arbitrage problems have affected 
the prices of debt securities.  The two examples represent relatively simple debt instruments: 
interest rate swaps and mortgage-backed securities securitized by the government agencies. 
These markets are admittedly at the periphery of the financial crisis.  However, because they 
are relatively simple, they are a good laboratory to isolate the limits of arbitrage effects I have 
discussed.  I will show that even these simple instruments demonstrate anomalous price 
patterns.  The broader lesson to take-away from these examples is that if prices on these simple 
securities are distorted because normal arbitrage forces do not operate, it is likely that prices 
on more complicated “toxic” assets are even more distorted.  Moreover, to the extent that 
these “toxic” assets have inflicted the largest losses on financial institutions, it likely that a 
component of these losses are due to limits of arbitrage problems.  
 
Interest Rate Swap Spread 
 
Interest rate swaps are largely used by corporations and banks to manage the interest rate risk 
in their assets and liabilities. If a corporation wants to enter into a swap, it contacts a bond 
dealer – typically the large Wall Street banks – and requests a quote from a trader.  The bank 
sets a price, and if a transaction occurs, the bank is the counterparty on the swap with the 
corporation.  The swap market is large and active. The International Swap Dealers Association 
reports in 2008 that the total volume of interest rate swaps transactions outstanding was 
$403.1 trillion.  
 
Figure 8 graphs the 30-year interest rate swap spread from June 2008 to June 2009.  The 30-
year swap spread measures the difference between 30-year U.S. Treasury bond rates and the 
interest rate swap rate for trading a fixed interest rate against floating (LIBOR) interest rates, 
                                                           
17 Gromb and Vayanos (2002) present a model in which arbitrage exists in the asset markets because of financial 
constraints on the arbitrageurs.   
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for 30 years. The figure also graphs the underlying Treasury and swap rates. Since the swap rate 
reflects an interest rate from major banks (LIBOR), which in turn reflects bank credit risk, swap 
rates are almost always higher than Treasury rates.   
 
Since September 2008, this normal relationship has been overturned: 30-year swap rates have 
been below Treasury rates. During fall 2008, swap rates fall faster than Treasury rates to cause 
the spread to fall negative. On November 28, 2008, the 30 year swap rate was 40 basis points 
below the 30-year Treasury. Market participants ascribe this reversal of the normal pattern to 
problems stemming from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  Lehman had entered into swap 
contracts with corporations, where Lehman was obligated to pay the fixed rate on the swaps. 
With Lehman’s demise, these corporations had to re-contract these swaps with other bond 
dealers.  This dynamic led to the swap rate falling.    It is not surprising that the demand from 
corporations to enter into pay-fixed swaps reduced the swap rate.  What is surprising is that the 
swap rate fell below Treasury rates.    
 
To see why the negative swap spread is anomalous, consider the following trade.  An 
arbitrageur could purchase $100 worth of a 30-year Treasury bond, say at 4 percent.  Using the 
Treasury as collateral, the arbitrageur can do a repurchase agreement where the arbitrageur 
pays the repo rate to finance this purchase, and then rolls over this financing every three 
months in the repo market, paying the then prevailing repo rate. The arbitrageur can then do a 
fixed rate swap paying 3.60 percent and receiving the three-month LIBOR—that is, where the 
LIBOR rate is reset every 3 months. The cash-flows from these trades are as follows: 
Treasury Purchase:   Receive 4% per annum for next 30 years 
      Pay 3-month repo rate, rolled every 3 months, to finance the purchase 
Swap Trade:    Pay 3.60% per annum for next 30 years 
      Receive 3-month LIBOR rate, reset every 3 months, for next 30 years  
First note that the trade essentially eliminates all interest rate risk.  If interest rates rise, both 
the three-month repo rate as well as the three-month LIBOR rate will rise. If they rise one-for-
one, the change in interest rates is offset. The only source of interest rate risk is if they don’t 
rise one-for-one – but in this case, such risk works actually works in the arbitrageur’s favor.  
LIBOR rates have been between 100 and 300 basis points above the Treasury repo rate 
recently; historically, this spread is always positive, but averaged closer to 40 basis points.  
Thus, based on current values, the difference between the LIBOR receipt and the repo payment  
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earns the arbitrageur 100 to 300 basis points currently. While this profit may revert to 40 basis 
points eventually, it will always remain positive.  The latter is because LIBOR reflects unsecured 
bank financing, and repo rates reflect financing secured by Treasuries as collateral. When the 
financial world goes into a panic, the spread rises (as has been the case recently), so that the 
“risk” goes in the arbitrageur’s favor. The trade also earns a fixed rate differential of 40 basis 
points. Moreover, if the swap spread turns positive, the arbitrageur can unwind the trade at a 
profit.  The trade has “positive carry” and substantial upside.   
Why is this trade not being done in sufficient size to eliminate the negative swap spread? The 
factors discussed earlier have plausibly limited arbitrageurs’ willingness to take on this trade.  
The trade requires risk capital, but there was little risk capital in the marketplace during this 
time period, especially after September 2008. The repo requires a haircut, which was larger 
than usual, as well as collateral to guarantee the swap payments.  Counterparty risk has played 
a role in the repo market: lenders may not be willing to lend as freely to all arbitrageurs to buy 
the Treasuries.  Counterparty risk also affects the interest rate swap, and arbitrageurs may be 
less willing to enter such a bilateral contract with another financial institution at this time.  The 
fact that these factors have prevented an anomalous market relationship from reverting back 
to the norm indicates the role that broken plumbing has played in debt markets. 
 
GNMA Mortgage-Backed Security 
 
Let us consider an asset that is one step more complicated to value, but also one step closer to 
the heart of the current crisis. Figure 9 graphs the option-adjusted spread on the 30-year 6 
percent GNMA (Government National Mortgage Association) mortgage-backed security.  Since 
a mortgage offers a homeowner the option to prepay, to compare the mortgage-backed 
security yield to other bond market interest rates, one has to strip out the value of the option.  
The option-adjusted spread presented in the figure is computed based on Bloomberg’s built-in 
prepayment model. Thus, the spread reflects only the excess return one can earn from buying 
the mortgage-backed security.  Although Bloomberg’s option value computation is probably not 
as fine-tuned as an investment bank’s pricing model, my discussion focuses on how the spreads 
move up at the “right” times, rather than on the absolute level of these spreads. 
 
The solid line graphs the spread on the GNMA security versus the interest rate swap rate (which 
is, as explained a few paragraphs back, the fixed interest rate one would pay in exchange for a 
floating LIBOR interest rate).  The GNMA security carries the explicit “full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government” and are therefore as safe as Treasuries. GNMA securities have much higher  
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underwriting standards than subprime mortgages, so that the typical equity buffer is on the 
order of 20 percent. Moreover, if a homeowner defaults on a mortgage, the U.S. government 
absorbs any losses, paying par to the holder of the mortgage-backed security. Thus, there is no 
default issue with these securities, and the remaining risks (as with all mortgage-backed 
securities) are prepayment risk and interest rate risk.  The spread between the GNMA bonds 
and interest rate swap rates is then partly a compensation that an investor requires for bearing 
prepayment risk and interest rate risk.  During normal periods, the compensation investors 
require for bearing these risks are fairly small. Indeed, prior to February 2008, the spread is 
negative, reflecting the low credit risk (compared to the interest rate swap rate) that comes 
with the explicit government guarantee.   
 
The first blip upwards in the spread is in March 2008 with the Bear Stearns event.  Bear Stearns 
was an important player in the mortgage market, and thus one reading of this graph is that risk 
capital devoted to pricing and bearing the risks of mortgage-backed securities shrank in the 
aftermath of the Bear Stearns event. The next blip upwards in the spread is at the end of July 
2008, corresponding to the problems with the private mortgage giants, Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”). Although GNMA was not directly affected in this event, the problems at 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac further shrank the risk-capital in the mortgage market.  The 
spread increases again the week of September 26, 2008.  Note that since the spread is 
measured relative to swaps, and LIBOR was also affected during this event, the spread rise is 
not initially dramatic.   Finally, the spread in the 2009 period falls as the crisis has abated. But 
even by mid-2009, the spread had not returned to negative values.   
Over this period, the spread moves from -25 basis points to over 150 basis points.  This is a 
dramatic change in the return investors require for bearing mortgage-backed security risks, 
especially when such securities carry an explicit government guarantee and the comparison 
rate (swaps) do not.  Note also that this large movement in spreads dwarfs any problems 
stemming from using interest rate swaps as the comparison rate. As discussed previously, 
interest rate swap rates have themselves been distorted in the crisis, but the magnitude of such 
distortion is around 40 basis points through this period.   One can also construct the spread 
between GNMA bonds and Treasuries and produce a similar picture to Figure 9.  
Apparently arbitrage is limited here as well. While I am pointing to only a few data points to 
make my argument, more complex work studying longer time-series and cross-sections of 
mortgage-backed security shows that the mortgage-backed security market does exhibit 
significant limits of arbitrage effects (Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2007). Why has this 
spread has remained at high levels rather than returning to the early 2007 levels?  Again, to buy 
the GNMA mortgage-backed security requires risk capital, of which there is little.  Moreover,  
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the purchase must be financed in the repo market and repo haircuts have risen.  Finally, to earn 
the high return as depicted in the figure, a trader must also do offsetting trades in swaps, and 
that carries counterparty risk.   
 
For financial institutions, the pricing effects reflected in the behavior of the GNMA mortgage-
backed security is important because it suggests that the value of financial claims reflecting 
future mortgage risk is especially low. Hence the losses on financial institutions balance sheets 
are larger than they would otherwise be if prices were at fundamental value.  For households 
and the mortgage market more generally, the high GNMA spread helps explain why mortgage 
rates had remained high in the fall of 2008, despite the general drop in interest rates as 
reflected by the lower federal funds interest rate or the lower rates on Treasuries.  
 
 
Government Policy to Plug the Leaks 
 
Many academics and policymakers think that asset prices during the crisis have deviated 
significantly from fundamental values and that this deviation is part of the problem affecting 
financial institutions.  For example, if mortgage and credit assets, which banks hold in plenty, 
are priced below fundamental values, then banks will be assessed larger losses than they 
otherwise would. This in turn can lead to binding bank capital requirements and a reduction in 
bank lending, thus resulting in a deeper recession.   
 
Of course, it is ultimately hard to assess fundamental value on the most toxic mortgage-backed 
securities, which are entangled in subprime mortgages as well as tranches of claims that bear 
different losses, as well as mixed with credit default swaps.  Claims by banks that their assets 
are really worth substantially more than the market price should be rightly treated with some 
suspicion by bank regulators and investors.  On the other hand, the evidence I have presented 
shows that the basic financial plumbing that enforces fundamental value relationships in debt 
markets has been impaired during this financial crisis. There is circumstantial evidence for 
deviations between fundamental value and market value in certain debt markets.   
 
We can view many of the government’s policy initiatives from this perspective: they are 
different ways to clear the plumbing in debt markets, and thus overcome the limits of arbitrage  
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problems, with the hope that it will speed the process of diminishing any gap between market 
prices and fundamental prices. Consider four government initiatives from the last few years in 
this light.  
 
First, the U.S. Treasury initiated the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in fall 2008, which 
eventually took the form of the government purchasing equity capital in over 600 commercial 
banks nationwide.  Nearly $200 billion has been spent on the capital purchases.   As noted 
earlier, the risk capital of the financial sector has fallen in this crisis. TARP is an effort to offset 
some of the lost capital.  However, note that TARP is directed primarily to commercial banks, 
and commercial banks are only a subset of the actors in the financial sector. Thus, other policies 
were needed if the goal was to have a direct effect on the rest of the financial sector.  
 
A second initiative was an alteration of the traditionally Federal Reserve “discount window” 
whereby commercial bank may receive loans, while pledging some collateral to the Fed.  This 
discount window facility is essentially a repo loan that the Fed has made available to 
commercial banks.  Prior to 2007, the collateral was most commonly bonds issued by the U.S. 
Treasury or a government-sponsored agency.  But since 2007, the discount window has altered 
its practices in two ways. One change is that the Fed has expanded the facility to lend to 
“primary bond dealers” (for example, Goldman, Sachs, Morgan Stanley and other non-
commercial banks) following the failure of Bear Stearns.  Since the majority of debt market 
trades and repo loans flow through these bond dealers, the expansion of the discount window 
provides them alternative financing to offset the problems in the repo market.  The other major 
change in discount window policy has been to broaden the class of debt instruments that the 
Fed accepts as collateral.  In many cases, the Fed now charges lower haircuts on this collateral 
than the private repo market.    It is difficult to compare these haircuts directly, because there is 
heterogeneity among assets, but for some of the tranches of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities, the private market haircuts are 100 percent, while the Fed offers haircuts around 20 
percent.   
 
In a third policy step, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have initiated a Term Asset-Backed 
Lending Facility (TALF).  TALF offers repo loans against the collateral of newly issued asset-
backed securities, for a loan maturity of up to three years.  For many of these securities, the 
private repo market offers only overnight loans, or has shut down.  In some markets, there is 
virtually no new issuance of certain asset-backed securities because investors cannot obtain the 
repo necessary to purchase the securities; for example, a credit card lender may not be able sell 
off credit card loans into a secondary market. This shift can be costly to an end-consumer, 
because it tends to tighten the supply of consumer credit.  TALF is an effort to offset the 
maturity shortening of the private repo market, and in the process, expand the market’s 
capacity for absorbing new asset-backed securitizations. In a similar vein, traditional discount  
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window loans from the Federal Reserve were overnight loans to commercial banks.  During the 
financial crisis, the Fed has offered longer-term 28-day discount window loans.  This initiative is 
also to offset the maturity contraction that has taken place in private debt markets.  
 
A fourth step is that the Federal Reserve and the government-sponsored enterprises have been 
purchasing mortgage-backed securities since the end of 2008 (see the “Press Release” of 
November 25 , 2008, at 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm>).   Plans are in place 
to purchase in excess of $1 trillion of mortgage-backed securities issued by government-
sponsored enterprises. This initiative is an effort to directly purchase assets that may be trading 
below fundamental value.  In addition, to the extent that these assets are removed from the 
balance sheets of financial institutions, their mortgage risks and their probability of financial 
distress falls.  As a result, it is plausible that financial institutions become less risk averse 
towards taking the risks of new additional lending.   
 
These initiatives all affect different aspects of the limits of arbitrage problem.   However, in 
order to draw conclusions on the merits of each of these initiatives, it is necessary to 
understand the cause of the limits of arbitrage problems and the advantage of the government 
relative to the private sector in overcoming these problems.  Let me conclude by offering my 
views on where such an advantage may lie. 
 
As I have discussed, there are perverse feedback effects that have played a role in the 
malfunctioning of debt markets.  In the risk-capital context, falling asset prices decrease risk 
capital, increasing financial institutions’ risk aversion, further reducing asset prices.  In the 
haircut context, falling liquidity raises haircuts, reducing repo activity and trading, further 
reducing liquidity.  These types of feedbacks are indicative of externalities.  Indeed, a number of 
papers formally study these type of externalities and describe policies to improve outcomes; 
Krishnamurthy (2009) reviews some models of this financing externality.  Take the risk capital 
feedback I have described.  A given firm will see a lower benefit of selling equity to increase its 
risk capital, relative to the benefit for the whole financial sector, because of the external effect 
that the firm’s risk capital has on other firms’ risk capital.  A related argument is that the 
financial sector is systemically important since it is essential for credit extension to the real 
economy.  Thus, any impairment in the financial sector leads to a reduction in real activity.  If 
the financial sector does not internalize this effect, then again it may undervalue risk capital.  
Since the government can internalize these externalities in their decisions, one can offer a 
rationale for why the government should inject capital in the financial sector. 
  
 
24 
Another advantage of the government relative to the private sector is that the government has 
little (or no) demand for liquidity; that is, if the government needs cash, it can issue Treasury 
bills.  The evidence I have provided on the behavior of Treasury bill interest rates indicates that 
the private sector places an enormous value on these securities.  Thus, at the horizons that this 
credit crisis will play out, the government has no need to remain liquid. On the other hand, 
almost all private investors value retaining some liquidity in their investments.  The policy 
initiatives, especially those involving the expansions of the discount window and Term Asset-
Backed Lending Facility (TALF), essentially take advantage of the differential demand for 
liquidity.  Repo haircuts are high and maturities are short because private lenders are averse to 
being illiquid.  The government can offer lower haircuts and longer maturity repo loans, since it 
does not face liquidity considerations.  
 
These arguments I have offered on the beneficial effects of policy interventions during the crisis 
also have ramifications for policy in advance of crises.  Take the risk capital externality I have 
outlined.  The argument also implies that the financial sector will have too little risk capital and 
too much debt during “normal” periods, leaving the economy more prone to crises, as 
Krishnamurthy (2009) explains formally. Moreover, as is widely recognized, if the central bank 
intervenes during a crisis to reduce feedback effects, then such anticipated interventions 
creates a moral hazard problem that distorts financing choices during normal periods.  For 
these reasons, prudential policy should be geared toward requiring firms to carry higher capital 
levels.  More generally, the fallout during this crisis points to challenges going forward: 
regulation needs to be geared towards creating financial/organizational structures that are less 
prone to crises.  Similarly, I have argued that the U.S. government can provide liquidity during 
crises because it uniquely has no liquidity needs.  However, if the national debt increases 
rapidly, the government may one day find itself in the position that its creditworthiness is 
reduced to the point it too will demand liquidity.  This sobering thought offers a further 
reminder of the policy challenges we face going forward.  
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Table 1 
Debt Market Size  
($ billions) 
 
Loans  Outstanding  Securities  Outstanding 
Subprime mortgage 
loans 
300   Asset-backed securities  1750 
Alt-A mortgage loans  600  Asset-backed securities in 
the form of collateralized 
debt obligations 
400 
Prime mortgage loans  3800  Prime mortgage-backed 
securities 
3800 
Commercial Real 
Estate 
2400  Commercial mortgage-
backed securities 
940 
Corporate Loans  3700  High-grade Corporate  
Debt 
600 
    Collateralized loan 
obligations 
350 
Total for Loans  $10,800  Total for Securities  $7,840 
 
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2008, Table 1.1. 
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Table 2 
Financial Institution Assets  
($ billions) 
 
 
Financial Institution  Total Assets 
Commercial Banks  $11,192 
Insurance Companies  6,308 
GSEs  3,174 
Brokers and Dealers  3,092 
Hedge Funds  3,406 
 
Sources: Flow of Funds of Federal Reserve 2007, He and Krishnamurthy (2008). 
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Table 3 
Losses, by Financial Institution and Debt Instrument 
($ billions) 
 
 
 
Amounts 
Outstanding 
  Estimated 
Losses and 
Writedowns 
 
    Banks  Insurers  Hedge Funds 
+ Other 
Real Estate Loans  $7100 billion  150  15  40 
ABS + ABS CDOs    2150  260  110  40 
Prime mortgage-backed 
securities 
  3800  20  10  <5 
Commercial mortgage-
backed securities 
    940  85  25  20 
Corporate Debt + CLOs    4650  135  40  30 
Total  17920  650  200  135 
 
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2008, Table 1.1 
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Table 4 
Repo Haircuts 
 
    Repo   Haircuts   
 
Spring 
2007 
Spring 
2008 
Fall 
2008 
Spring 
2009 
US Treasuries (short-term)  2%  2%  2%  2% 
US Treasuries (long-term)  5  5  6  6 
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities   2.5  6  8.5  6.5 
Corporate Bonds 
A-/A3 or above 
5  10  20  20 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
(CMOs)  AAA 
10  30  40  40 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) 
AA/Aa2 and above 
10  25  30  35 
 
Source: DTCC, Investment Bank Reports 
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Figure 2: Dealer Repo Activity ($Billions, Rolling Monthly Average) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
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Figure 3: CDS Rates (Basis Points) 
Source: Datastream 
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FNMA BONDS 
   
Figure 4: FNMA Spreads to Treasuries (bps) 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 5: 3-Month Treasury Bill, 3-Month OIS, Fed Funds Target (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 6: Ratio of Overnight Repo to Term Repo (1 Month Average) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York  
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Figure 7: Commercial Paper Issuance (Millions of $) 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Figure 8: 30 Year Swaps. Interest Rates (left-axis) and Spread (right-axis) in%.  
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
 
  
 
39 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: OAS on GNMA 6s versus Swap Rates (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
 